Self-Forming Actions & Authorship

In Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism Robert Kane presents what he believes is a plausible idea to save indeterminism with respect to human actions. He presents an objection to the common ‘intuition pump’ of the Luck Principle (LP) which states “if an action is undetermined at time t then it’s happening rather than not happening at t would be a matter of chance or luck and so it could not be a free and responsible action” (pp 299). Prima facie, these ‘intuition pumps’ lead people to think freedom and responsibility is incompatible with indeterminism. The incompatibilist’s instinct presupposes that any indeterminacy in antecedent events compromises human agency and free will with respect to the outcome of an action. By this view, both determinism and indeterminism in antecedent events would jeopardize the ultimate control of an agent’s actions for any libertarian. As a solution, Kane thinks incompatibilists should not deny that when we act, we are acting from an already formed will, instead Kane thinks this formed will is “our own free-will” by virtue of the torn decisions we have when faced with competing options. In this paper, I will argue that self-forming actions do not negate external influences and are therefore not in the agent’s control.

Then I will highlight the inconsistent logic present in Kane’s view of SFA and other incompatibilists instinct in their assumption that luck or chance removes responsibility for an agent’s action. Lastly, I will demonstrate why my theory of the God Principle (GP) better encapsulates the purpose of SFA’s as a quasi-freedom that still allows for a subjective experience of control with respect to human actions. For Kane, SFA’s occur at times in life when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become. Perhaps we are torn between doing the moral thing or acting from self-interest, or between present desires or when we are faced with a difficult task for which we have aversions (pp. 306, Kane). Since indeterminism is seen as a threat and hindrance to free-will for both Kane and other incompatibilists, he wants to demonstrate that just because something is undetermined at t does not mean that it is happening as a matter of chance or luck.

In response to Mele’s LP and LP* objection, he uses the case of the businesswoman, angry husband, and mathematician to show that due to the parallel processing in their brains at the time an agent makes a decision, regardless of the outcome in failing or succeeding, the decision was
made intentionally and voluntarily without compulsion or coercion and therefore is a free and responsible action by virtue of the agent’s efforts in this world or another possible world. In the case of the businesswoman, there is a genuine sense of freedom since her SFA (internal indeterminacy) represented by chaotic activity in the brain at the neural level seems undecided prior to her making her decision to assist the victim or not. Kane claims that this SFA is what grants us plural voluntary control (PVC) and this fundamentally makes human action free. While I agree with Kane that indeterminacy at the neural level does not mean the subsequent action is as a result of random chance in the sense that her action was a mistake or fluke, I disagree that SFA’s are self-forming in the way he describes. A SFA is an expression of not only an agent’s character but of contingent circumstances like genes and environment.

Scientifically speaking, we do not choose what traits we inherit, our level of intelligence or capacities nor do we choose the environment we are socialized in. Therefore, while we are free to want what we will, we are not free to will what we will. Take for instance Alice who has been conditioned from birth to always put others before herself because it’s the moral thing to do, not to mention that her parents and community instilled a deep psychological fear of punishment in the event she does not adhere to these principles. Agreeable and docile Alice, based on the postulates of moral responsibility and fear, chooses to help the assault victim without hesitation, as somewhat of an automatic response. While she is still responsible for her acting and helping the victim, she did not have the full capacity to do otherwise; therefore, her internal indeterminacy compelled her to action by external influences. If SFAs are expressions of her character, it would follow an infinite regress and is not defensible against indeterminism since Mele could claim that it was merely a matter of chance that she was born in that environment and family as opposed to another one that would presumably reconfigure her SFA.

Furthermore, I disagree with both Kane and Ginet regarding the common libertarian instinct to assume that LP threatens moral responsibility with respect to human actions. Consider this counterfactual example, Jordan who has never before considered buying a lottery ticket, one day in the spur of the moment without any torn decisions buys a winning lottery ticket. I am confident that he would endorse the outcome and take full responsibility for having purchased a winning ticket without having experienced a torn decision. From this example, I can agree with Ginet’s noncausal libertarian account of free will that we do not need to have torn decisions in order to assume control over an action (pp.3, Ginet). We can still assume ownership and plural voluntary control even when we do not have full control over an outcome decided by even chance in this case. In this way, neither internal indeterminacy in the form of an SFA or determinism of any antecedent event precludes responsibility.

Lastly, since contra-causal value experiments cannot be empirically proven but can be evoked as a thought experiment, I propose an alternative thought experiment in which I call the God Principle (GP) to save SFA’s in the face of indeterminism without negating moral responsibility. I believe the difference between P at t and P* at t would not be a matter of chance or luck but it would be the GP (can also be called God’s Plan). Since we did not choose the contingent antecedent circumstances that formed our SFA’s in the first place, our PVC is dependent on the ADC by way of the GP. Under the GP, we have quasi-freedom for while we are the actors and main characters in our stories, as I have shown, we are not the authors. By this view, neither determinism or indeterminism can limit one’s experience of choice or human action or jeopardize human responsibility for our actions. Most importantly, unlike the LP, we can avoid an infinite regress by affirming that human existence and experience is not an accident or a fluke but intentionally created with an ultimate purpose and plan. In other words, Divine supervenience is the ADC that is responsible for shaping and constraining our SFAs such that we cannot be assumed to be self-authors. The GP also provides both the necessary and sufficient reasons for human action and moral responsibility. We may not be able to control what happens in our lives, but we can control our attitudes towards it; we can narrate our actions for a better future.